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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
:

OPENING BRIEF OF
APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellee

Case No. 20010761 CA

MATTHEW DESPAIN,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is made pursuant to Rule 26(2)(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This court has
appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (1953 as
amended).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal of right after a guilty plea was entered pursuant to Rule 1 l(i) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The appellant reserved the right to appeal the trial
court's ruling on his motion to suppress. (R.66) The appeal is taken from a final judgment
of conviction for the offense count of Clandestine Laboratory Precursors and Equipment,
a Second Degree Felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37d-4 (1953 as amended).

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
After stopping a vehicle for an equipment violation, did the officers exceed the
scope of detention allowed for a such a stop by asking an investigatory question regarding
the appellant's possession of weapons without an articulable suspicion that the appellant
was presently armed or dangerous?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Factual determinations made on a motion to suppress are reviewed pursuant to a
clearly erroneous standard. Legal determinations and the application of facts to a legal
standard are reviewed without deference to the trial court's ruling. State v. Thurman, 846
P.2d 1256 (Utah, 1993). A trial court's determination of whether a particular set of facts
establishes a reasonable suspicion is reviewed for correctness with a measure of
discretion given to the trial judge's application of legal standard to the facts. State v.
Chapman, 921 P.2d 466 (Utah, 1995)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged in a seven count Information (R. 3-5). That Information
alleged that the appellant had committed the following offenses: Count 1: Clandestine
Laboratory Precursors and Equipment, a Second Degree Felony in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §52-37d-4 (1953 as amended); Count 2: Possession of a Controlled Substance, a
Second Degree Felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1953 as
amended); Count 3: Possession of a Controlled Substance in a Correctional Facility, a
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Third Degree Felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-311.3 (1953 as amended);
Count 4: Reckless Endangerment, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §76-5-112 (1953 as amended); and Count 6: Carrying a Concealed Dangerous
Weapon, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-504(1) (1953 as
amended). The seventh count of the Information was a forfeiture demand relating to both
the truck the defendant was driving and the currency he possessed at the time of his
arrest.
A motion to suppress was heard on November 15, 2000 (R. 57-58). The trial court
issued a written ruling denying that motion on December 7, 2001. The defendant entered
a guilty plea to Count 1 of the Information and consented to a forfeiture of the currency
seized from his person. (R. 63-71, 74-75) On August 15, 2001, sentence was imposed for
the Second Degree Felony. (R. 77-81) The indeterminate prison sentence of one to fifteen
years was suspended and the appellant was placed on probation for a period of 36 months.
(R. 77-81) A notice of appeal was filed on September 15, 2001. (R. 85-85)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 6, 1999, Heber City Police Officers Troy Slaugh and Rusty Olsen
were on patrol during the graveyard shift. (R. 106 at p. 5) Shortly after midnight, Slaugh
observed a pickup truck towing a trailer at the intersection of State Roads 40 and 189 in
Heber City. (R. 106 at p. 6, 52) The trailer did not have an operable rear license plate
light. (R.106 at p.6) Slaugh stopped the vehicle for that violation. (R.106 at p.6) As the
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officers approached the vehicle, a large rottweiler dog came at them from the trailer or the
bed of the pickup. (R. 106 at p. 7) Due to the presence of the dog, the officers requested
the appellant to get out of the vehicle. (R. 106 at p.2) The officers had requested appellant
meet them at them at a position that was away from the dog. (R. 106 at p. 8)
After the appellant approached the officers, Slaugh requested his driver's license
and registration. (R. 106 at p. 10) As the appellant turned over his license, Olsen asked if
appellant had any weapons. (R. 106 at p. 10) The appellant stated that he had two knives.
(R. 106 at p. 11) Olsen asked the question about weapons because about one month
earlier he had stopped the appellant. (R. 51) At that time the appellant was carrying a
firearm. (R. 51) At the time of the stop in the instant case, appellant was wearing a shirt
that was not tucked into his pants. (R. 106 at p. 12) The appellant lifted his shirt and
exposed a large knife was sheathed and attached to his belt. (R. 106 at p. 14) The knife
was positioned lengthwise across his stomach. (R. 106 at p. 14) The appellant was
wearing his shirt in a way that prevented the officers from seeing the knife (R. 106 at p.
12)
A second smaller knife was sheathed and attached to the appellant's belt. (R. 106
at p. 13) The officers took the knives from the appellant. (R.106 at p. 11) Officer Slaugh
then went to his patrol car to run a records check on the appellant. (R. 106 at p. 13) The
officer also checked the state statute on concealed weapons. (R. 106 at p. 14) Based on
the way the appellant had worn the sheath, the nature of the weapon and its potential uses,

the officers arrested appellant for possession of a concealed dangerous weapon. (R. 106 at
p. 15-16)
The officers then began to search the appellant's vehicle incident to that arrest. (R.
106 at p. 17) At that time, the appellant's wife was in the passenger seat of the vehicle,
she was also requested to step out of the vehicle prior to the search. (R. 106 at p. 17)
Officer Slaugh noticed a child asleep in the bed of the pickup truck. (R. 106 at p. 17) As
officer Slaugh dealt with the child, officer Allred began to search the cab of the pickup
truck. (R. 106 at p. 20) Just as the search commenced, at about that time, appellant's
daughter stopped in her car. (R. 106 p. 18) She took custody of the dog and the child. (R.
106 at p. 18)
Officer Allred found a container with a small quantity of marijuana under the
passenger seat. (R. 106 p. 21, 61) In a purple backpack that the appellant's wife said was
hers, the officers located a glass pipe with marijuana residue in it. (R. 106 at p. 22)
Officer Allred found a glass pipe used to smoke methamphetamine behind the middle of
the seat. (R. 106 at pp. 61-62) The officers also inventoried the items in the truck bed and
trailer. (R. 106 at pp. 24-25) They located paraphernalia that was consistent with the
manufacture of methamphetamine. (R. 106 at p.26) Due to the nature of those materials,
the officers decided to impound the vehicle and continue the search during the day time.
(R. 106 at p. 54)
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The following afternoon the search was resumed. (R. 106 at 29) At that time, the
officers located a round bottom flask and ajar containing iodine pellets. (R. 106 at p. 30)
After those discoveries, they decided to obtain a search warrant. (R. 106 at p. 32) The
ensuing search resulted in the discovery of other chemicals including hydrogen peroxide
and alcohol. (R. 106 at pp. 32-33) All of those items are used in the manufacture
methamphetamine. (R.106 at p. 33)
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The appellant's vehicle was stopped for an equipment violation. The appellant was
the driver of the vehicle. As he complied with a request to provide the officers with his
driver's license, the appellant was asked if he was in possession of any weapons. That
was an investigatory question that was beyond the scope of the actions that an officer may
take during a traffic stop. The only justification for the question was that the appellant had
been arrested about one month earlier. At that time he was found to be in possession of a
weapon. An individual's past criminal behavior cannot be the sole basis to establish a
-6-

icasoitijIMk1 suspicion In <li l.iiiiii .nil indiuiliiiil I oiisoqiinilh , nlliccrs lacked llic requisite
reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop to include investigatory
questions about matters.unrelated to the basis for the stop,, The subsequent search violated
Hit* lll'onjiilt J"Vmendment and the evidence seized dm my, lhal search must be ordered lo be
suppressed.

ARGUMENT

AN OFFICER'S KNOWLEDGE OF APPELLANT'S
PAST CRIMINAL ACTIONS WITHOUT MORE
I N F O R M A T I O N , FAII ,S ' '• • ESTABLISH
\
REASONABLE SUSPICION
4 > ENGAGE IN
INVESTIGATORY OTTESTTON
VRFT-ATrr ~ o
A TRAFFIC STOP,

The issue of the presence of reasonable suspicion to justify investigatory
.•questioning during a traffic stop in this case was ra^cw m a motion to suppress in the trial
c

si ib mission • af < • 1: itten

memorandum, and. oral argument, the trial judge issued a written opinion. (R. i:^- *' ! hat
document included factual findings. (R. 46-52) in mat ruling, the trial court denieo the
n 10I11 in 11'! |hi Ihr 11/.iini i mi MI ill in lliir jipiKMl wir '.porifit fills iiiMirsnl in tllrii opinion.
(R.48)

The officers stopped the appellant for a motor vehicle equipment violation. (R. 52)
Specifically, the stop was for a violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-120(b) (1953 as
amended). That statute requires that rear license plate on a vehicle be illuminated. The
light over the rear license plate on the trailer that the appellant was towing was not
functioning. (R. 52) After the appellant was stopped, the officers summoned him to the
rear of the vehicle. (R. 51) As officer Slaugh requested appellant's driver's license and
registration, Olsen asked if the appellant had any weapons. (R. 51) The reason why that
question was asked was because the appellant had been arrested about one month earlier.
(R. 51) At that time he was carrying a firearm. (R. 51)
The stop of an automobile and detention of its occupants constitutes a seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all such warrantless searches, but only those are
unreasonable. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). A search or seizure is
constitutionally reasonable if it meets a two prong test: First, the police officer's action
must be justified from the inception. Second, the detention resulting from that action must
be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the
first place." Terry v. Ohio, 364 U.S. 1 at 19-20 (1968).
With respect to traffic stops, thefirstpart of this analysis is met if the stop is based
on a traffic or equipment violation. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). The
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J

Uj'l/

the test stating,
Once th * ^
i,.P ;
' \ Ator/.-i "must he
: <.\
temporary and last no lor.:
m is necessary to efleciuate
the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500
(1983) Both the "length and [the] scope of the detention must
be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which
rendered its initiation permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d
761/763 (Utah 1991)
X/J. I1" J'tlal I i L!

•

•

'

This i/'O'inrt kid piTYiaush de'inibml the limitation i in lln M | , IIIM* ol lime
detention for a traffic stop m Stale v. Robinson, 797 P.Ai 431 (Ut. App. 1990). The
Lopez court adopted those limi;

he court

son stated,

...ai, v, nicer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a
driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer
•• •••. check and issue a citation However, once the driver has
produced a valid driver's license and evidence of entitlement
to use the vehicle, "he must be allowed to proceed on his way,
without being subjected to further dela> b;; police for
additional questioning."

797 P.2d at 435 In Lopez the court expanded the scope of the detention for a traffic stop
b> allow ing officers to determine if the di i ver has arrest warrants as part of the computer
check.
As pre\ iously indicated, the scone of a trait K. stop does no! include questioning the
driver about potential umiiiuu umduu Hun i> unicniko u> -U- \ Nation that provided the

.9.

basis for the stop. Event though the investigative questioning may be relatively short in
duration, it is unreasonable if it extends the scope of the detention beyond the length
necessary for the legitimate purposes of the step. See: United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.
675 (1985). In Lopez the court described the prerequisites for such questioning:
Investigative questioning that further detains the driver must
be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal
activity. Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on
specific, articulable facts drawn from the totally of the
circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop,
[citation omitted] If reasonable suspicion of more serious
criminal activity does arise, the scope of the stop is still
limited. The officer must "diligently [pursue] a means of
investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to
detain the defendant."
873P.2datll32.
In State v. Hansen, 17 P.3d 1135 (Ut. App. 2000), the court held that an officer's
question to the driver of an automobile unreasonably extended the scope of the detention
for a traffic stop. The officer asked the driver if he was in possession of any drugs,
alcohol or weapons. The driver responded in the negative and the officer then requested
to search the vehicle. The traffic stop in Hansen was based on an improper turn and
driving without insurance. The driver had done nothing to indicate that drugs, alcohol or
weapons were in the car. Nor had the officer made any observations that would justify the
investigative questions. The court in Hansen held that such questioning was not justified
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1»s iiiii\ reasonable suspicion ('oiisequenlly, the evidence that was discovered as a result
ofthat questioning was inadmissable.
The Supreme Court has addressed the question of the presence of reasonable
suspicion to conduit a search for weapons in several contexts, In Micl ligan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1U32 i l*)> i ni nllii ITS ubsmnl «i u Inrlt1 h iiii1 IIIM HI rinln lib I'lir IIIIIIM I I IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII i i
corner then drove off the road into a »:i\ - The drnei. Long, met officers at the rear of
the vehicle, Vv hen requested to produ^ ,-AC •. ehuk registration, Long began to walk
t

"1 In „" j U i i ' i T S n b

•

Long was stopped and the officers looked inside the vehicle. They discovered observ ed a
pom;

*°* wns later fo™ J *~ —*~:~ mariiuonr*

uri iitnst.intees instil

The C-HJIJ ft-au' 'h\e those
-

,* •:.

,

The circumstances establishing a tcaaonabie suspv ion included the erratic driving J
culminating in a single car accident, the driver's appearance of beinu under ilk- influence
of an iiitnxin .nil ami (lie Insl hand obseiwihon ot the hunting kinle in the area about to be
re-entered by Long.
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms. 434 I J.S. 10f> ; "977h the defendam had been stopped
f'»i" 'Invilli.1 "Mil n» i:\(int'«l license plate I he ;->jpreme ( ^AXI iieie. ^ai there was no
Fourth Amendment violation when the officers onlerul 11 it *!rlt IN'LIII'I In prl mil nil lln
automobile Aftei exiting the cai , the offi.ce.rs observed, a bulge in the defendant's
clothing that was consistent with a concealed weapon. That observation permitted the

officers to conclude that the defendant was armed and "...posed a serious and present
danger to the safety of the officers." 434 U.S. at 112.
The defendant in Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143 (1972), had a firearm seized
from his person as he was seated in a parked car. The officer who made the seizure had
received information that the defendant was seated in a specified vehicle was carrying
narcotics and a firearm. The court held that the information had sufficient indicia of
reliability to justify the officer's stop and subsequent search. As in Long, and Mimms the
information available to the officers in Adams v. Williams allowed them to conclude that
the defendant was presently armed and potentially posed a danger to them.
In several cases, this court has addressed the question of whether officers have a
reasonable suspicion to believe who a person that is the subject of a vehicle and stop
poses a danger to them. The rulings have required that the information establish that the
reasonable suspicion be of a present danger. In State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866 (Ut. App.
1992), the defendant was had been stopped for speeding. While obtaining the defendant's
driver's license and vehicle registration, the trooper noticed a rifle in the hatchback
portion of the vehicle. As the trooper was running a license check he observed the
defendant move a bag toward him from the hatchback portion of the vehicle. When the
trooper reapproached the vehicle he observed the bag. He asked the defendant about other
firearms in the vehicle. The defendant denied that there were any. He then agree to let the
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Ironnrt

^Mirll

lllll

U ' l l l I K III"

I III

lllHlH i p i ' ! |i i M l l ' l l t i l l

11 I I l I I I 11 illlinl II11 I I I 111 ( I ! I I | i I I I llll

I lie

n Ik -ie had pre\ IOUSK obsrn cd was found to be stolen.
. The cov*
belief" llul ii s

;

i M .:aju.;d. discussed the reasonable suspicion standard as it applied to a
I -I ilanj.. i mir

I Ii

ml 'J.ilal,

. ^;<.j; <:A oituer reasonably believes a Mispeci is dangerous
and ma> obtair- nmnecuK Mniro1 »f weapons :* protective
search * .. 'HK : Ah < .vt n.i<IIUIKM
active
weapons search onix it "a reasonably pruden: | * u
* the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his [or
her] safety or that of others was in danger,"[citation omitted]
839 P.2d at 870. Hie court held that under the circumstances in Bradford, a reasonable
officer would hdicvc in.> safelx- xvnuld have been at risk The factors that the ^ourt relied
L

It'll*

•

l, , \ i ! .'

>\

. :

,K*

presence of the rifle and the defendant's furtive movements.
. In State v. O'Brien. 959 P.2d 647 (I Jt. Api > 1998), the court, found that an officer
hail a iCiisonuMi. suspii ion i I poh/nlinl

II.IIIJH'I

that allowed him to question the defendant

about the presence of firearms. That suspicion a 1 so a 11 o w ed I m i m i ni I loo Is i i I 11»1! 11 n a s se 11 \i e r
compartment of the vehicle after «i 'Jnp for an equipment violation. The trooper in
O i)Mt

scivi'd llnil "ii' ul I lie

nliuels on llic defendant's truck was wobbling.

After the trooper turned on his overhead lights he saw the driver of th^
if he was trying to hide or recover something. When the vehicle was snapped, because of
those obser vations, the officei had »•.

^Icudant step to the rear oi the truck
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The

observations provided a reasonable suspicion for the officer's questions to the defendant
about his movements and the presence of weapons. They also provided a basis for the
search of the vehicle.
These rulings are consistent with those previously discussed from the Supreme
Court. In all of these cases the officers had reasonable suspicions based on observations
or information that allowed them to conclude that the defendants were presently in
possession of weapons or otherwise posed a danger to the officers. In the instant case, the
only justification for the investigatory question was the defendant's past criminal
behavior. (R. 51) About one month earlier, he had been stopped and found in possession
of a firearm. (R. 51) That information fails to establish a reasonable suspicion to believe
that he possessed a weapon at the time of the stop at issue in this case.
The cases that address the question of utilizing past criminal behavior as a basis for
establishing a reasonable suspicion indicate that such behavior cannot be the sole
determinate of reasonable suspicion. This position is consistent with the case law
previously discussed. Reliance solely on past criminal behavior to establish a reasonable
suspicion would fail to demonstrate that the defendant was presently armed or dangerous.
Further, as a matter of policy, if past criminal behavior could be the sole basis to establish
a reasonable suspicion, anyone who had any criminal history could be stopped or detained
without any indication that they are presently committing or about to commit a crime.
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The nsi «i.l ii.i'J »iiiiiiiiii! kliiiviiii lu establish reasonable suspicion was addressed
in State v. Humphrey, 93? P.2d 137 (Ut. App
trooper stoppi '
vcl in 11 • 11

.. •

Montecelir ~Ttah
........

19 9 '/ ) I*" tl i. it t ^^ • a 1 lighw a.) pat i ol
hie defem*.* •* M* .. passenger in the

;,obt ;ather was a highway patrol trooper. The trooper

asked the female if he could search the \eliiiele Slir utiiisetileil hul lln ileleniLiiiI u-llul „il
her and fold her not to consent to the search. After releasing the two, the trooper received
information from the father of the female.' I he father indicated that, his daughter had been
usii ig dn igs and w as going oi it i ith a mai I v h :

• as

indicated that his daughter had told him that she had transported drugs from Arizona to
Colorado.
Based on lli.il minim.ilinn ofllm.s

IIIII

lln diej lujjwii In look Ini llie cai A second

trooper observed the vehicle speeding without a front license piatc

:

* *

'* .ndant was driving. The trooper who made the stop had known the female ana "ler
linnils Inr m
i nil IIIIIIIIII I MI nil! u\:ii

1 lie linopu spoke with tin female n i his patrol cai I le

noticed that she was nervous and'that she made some statements ihni n en mini i niisisieni
with her background When, they returned to the defendant's car, the female stated that
„!ie Hii\ i einliil I lie ildciulanl hai I ::Iecl a jacket to the trooper to give to the female. \ s the
trooper passed the jacket to the female hi (ell a Innl nh|n I ill die |inekel

Hi n nli|i i i

was a container and when opened and found to contain drugs. A subsequent search of the
vehicle resulted in the discove™ =., „ large quantity of methamphetamine.
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The defendant argued that the trooper lacked a reasonable suspicion to detain him
to conduct a investigation beyond that allowed for a traffic stop. In discussing the effect
that the defendant's prior criminal behavior had on that analysis, the court stated,
We recognize that consideration of the individual's past
criminal history is not part of the probable cause
delermination [citation omitted] However, information
regarding an individual's past, and in this case ongoing,
criminal activity can be a factor in determining reasonable
suspicion.

937 P.2d at 143. In addition to the historical information provided by the female's father,
other information was relied upon to establish reasonable suspicion to question the couple
beyond that allowed in a traffic stop. Those factors included that the direction of travel of
the defendant was consistent with the information regarding travel from Arizona to
Colorado, to transport drugs, the nervousness of both occupants and the statements of the
female.
In the State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Ut. App. 1993), the court also discussed the
effect of past criminal activity on the reasonable suspicion analysis. The court indicated,
...| A] previous arrest for criminal conduct may be relevant to
a suspicion that a suspect might be presently dangerous,
depending on the nature of the charge, but is not
determinative
856 P.2d at 661. In White the officers had received an anonymous tip that the defendant
had been involved in a domestic disturbance and was on drugs. The source also described
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where the defendant could be located, the car he was in and who he was with. It was also
indicated that the defendant was on parole.
The court found that the initial encounter with the defendant may have been
justified . However, the subsequent search of his person and the car could not. The court
found that the anonymous tip lacked reliability. The state attempted to justify the search
of the defendant's person because he was on parole and was wearing a long coat that
could conceal a weapon. The court rejected this argument based on the previously
described reasoning relating to prior criminal activity. The court held that wearing a long
coat was not a sufficient indication of dangerousness to justify a detention or search even
when combined with knowledge of the defendant's criminal history.
One Utah Supreme Court case involves the analysis of the defendant's prior
criminal activity in determining if there was a reasonable suspicion to conduct a search,
State v. RovbalL 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986). In that case the defendant was arrested for a
domestic disturbance in which shots were fired. At the time of the arrest no firearm was
found. The defendant was released from jail the following morning. Shortly after being
released, the defendant called the police with a complaint about a suspicious vehicle.
When the police went to the area, the suspicious vehicle could not be located. The
officers then encountered Royball, who leaned against a vehicle as if he was concealing
something behind his back. The court held that the totality of

these facts could

reasonably support the conclusion that a weapon was available to the defendant. They
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also could have concluded, based on the observations of the actions of the defendant, that
he had a weapon concealed behind his back. The police conducted a pat down search of
the defendant. A gun was found hidden in the defendant's pants in the small of his back.
The appellant in this case was questioned about possessing weapons during his
initial contact with the police officers. That questioning was investigative in nature and
was beyond the scope of detention for a traffic stop. State v. Lopez, supra. Such
questioning must be based a reasonable suspicion by the officers that the appellant was in
possession of a weapon. State v. Lopez, supra. The officers did not actually observe a
weapon. They did not observe any bulges in the appellant's clothing consistent with
possession of weapons. They did not observe any furtive gestures or movements by the
appellant that would lead them to infer that he was attempting to arm himself. Nor did
they have any confidential information that he was possessing a weapon. The only
information thait the officers had was that the appellant was involved in a previous
encounter with the police where he was found to be armed. That encounter was about one
month earlier. That information alone is not sufficient to establish that the appellant
constituted a present danger to themselves or others at the time of the stop or detention at
issue in this case.
The seizure of the knives following the investigative question was the direct result
of the Fourth Amendment violation. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
The subsequent arrest of the appellant for the concealed weapon offense also resulted
-18-

from the initial Fourth Amendment violation. The search of the truck and trailer further
resulted from the detention and arrest. Consequently, all of the evidence seized during the
searches of the appellant's vehicle must be ordered suppressed.
CONCLUSION
The evidence that would support the conviction in this case was seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. The appellant's judgment and conviction should be reversed
and the case remanded to the Fourth District Court with an order requiring the lower court
to reverse the conviction and withdraw the guilty plea previously entered in this case.
DATED this 2 a

day of June, 2002.
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Mark Shurtleff
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Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
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ADDENDUM

DEREK P. PULLAN, #6633
Wasatch County Attorney
THOMAS L. LOW, #6601
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney
123 South Main Street, Suite 11
HeberCity,UT 84032
Telephone: (435)654-2909
Fax:
(435)654-2947

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MATTHEW L. DESPAIN,
DOB: 12/21/1955,
6945 South Greenfield Way
Salt Lake City, UT 84121

INFORMATION

CaseNo.

W)ff$

Ity

Judge ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD

Defendant.
The undersigned THOMAS L. LOW, under oath states on information and belief that the
defendant, in Wasatch County, State of Utah, committed the following crime(s):

^
/

COUNT 1: CLANDESTINE LABORATORY PRECURSORS AND EQUIPMENT in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4, a second degree felony, as follows: That on or about
November 6, 1999, the defendant knowingly or intentionally
(a) possessed a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine
laboratory operation;
(b) possessed laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a clandestine
laboratory operation.
OUNT 2: POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, WITH A
PRIOR CONVICTION in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), a second degree
felony, as^mlows: That on or about November 6, 1999, the defendant having been previously
convict&i of Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, did knowingly and
intentionally possess or use Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance.

COUNT 1: TRANSPORTATION OR POSSESSION OF ITEMS PROHIBITED IN
CORRECTIONAL AND MENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-8-311.3, a third degree felony, as follows: That on or about November 6,1999, the
defendant (4)(d) without the permission of the authority operating the correctional facility or the
secure area of a mental healtfrfacility, knowingly possessed at a correctional facility or a secure
area of a mental health facility any controlled substance, to wit: Marijuana.
COUNT 4: RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112, a
class A misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about November 6, 1999, the defendant, under
circumstances not amounting to a felony offense, recklessly engaged in conduct that created a
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person.
COUNT 5: POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37a-5(l), a class B misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about November 6, 1999, the
defendant did lmowingly,/imentionally or recklessly use, or possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert,
produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest,
inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body.

/
/

/
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COUNT 6: CARRYING A CONCEALED DANGEROUS WEAPON in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-504(1), a class B misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about November 6,
1999, the defendant did carry ^concealed dangerous weapon,
(a) which was not a firearm, on his person or one that is readily accessible for immediate use
which is not securely encased, as defined in this part, in a place other than his residence,
property, or business under his control; or
(b) without a valid concealed firearm permit carried a concealed dangerous weapon which is a
firearm and that contains no ammunition.
COUNT 7: FORFEITURE DEMAND in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13, a, as
follows: That on or about November 6, 1999, the defendant Plaintiff hereby demands forfeiture
of property, which is property the defendant has an interest in, and was seizedfromsaid
defendant as a result of said Count(s) of this Information, and said property being
(e) a conveyance used or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the
transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property; to wit: 1973 Black
Chevrolet Pick-Up Truck,
(g) something of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of Utah Code Title 58, Chapter 37, Controlled Substances, or moneys,
negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of
Utah Code Title^8, Chapter 37, Controlled Substances; to wit($362.00) three hundred sixty two
dollars in cash.^/ PS1/
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

RULING ON MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

Plaintiff

CASE NO. 991500176 & 991500177
vs.

DATE: December 7,2000

MATTHEW DESPAIN &
ANNLDESPAIN,

JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS
CLERK: SGJ

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for oral argument and hearing on Defendants'
Motion to Suppress on November 15, 2000. Defendants were present and represented by Mark
A. Besendorfer, Esq., and the State of Utah was represented by Thomas L. Low, Deputy Wasatch
County Attorney.
Witnesses were called, evidence received and arguments were made. Since the briefing
by counsel had only been received by the Court on the day of the hearing, the Court took the
matter under advisement in order to review the memoranda. Counsel also stipulated that the
Court could utilize the transcript of the preliminary hearing conducted on January 26, 2000 in
reaching its decision.
L
FACTS
1.

On November 6, 1999, around midnight Officer Troy Slaugh was traveling

southbound on SR 40, Main Street, in Heber, Wasatch County, Utah. Officer Rusty Olsen was
traveling in the vehicle with Officer Slaugh who was driving. Officer Olsen was dressed in plain
clothes, but he did have a gun and badge.
2.

Officer Slaugh observed a truck pulling afifthwheel trailer and further observed

that the rear license plate lacked illumination in violation of law; UCA 41-6-120(b).

3.

Before the stop, Officer Slaugh called dispatch with the plate number and learned

that the vehicle was registered to a Matthew Despain. Officer Slaugh recognized the name
because about a month before he had been called to the Wasatch County Jail to meet with
Trooper Kevin Roads in order to perform a drug recognition evaluation on an arrestee; Matthew
Despain.
4.

Officer Slaugh testified that he knew that Mr. Despain, on the previous occasion,

had been in possession of a handgun and had been armed and dangerous.
5.

Officer Slaugh stopped the subject vehicle for the license plate violation. As the

officer approached the vehicle, a large Rottweiler dog in the bed area of the truck jumped out at
him and was barking hysterically and the officer testified he feared it was going to attack him.
Because the Rottweiler was aggressive and lunging at him, he drew hisfirearmand retreated from
the vehicle.
6.

The officer requested that Mr. Despain, who had exited his vehicle, control his

dog. The officer further requested that Mr. Despain walk back to him. Mr. Despain, contrarily,
returned back and got back into the cab of the truck and closed the door.
7.

The officer called to him again and he exited the truck and came back to the

8.

Officer Slaugh requested to see his driver's license, and almost simultaneously

officer.

Officer Rusty Olsen, who was standing next to Officer Slaugh, asked him whether he had any
weapons.
9.

Mr. Despain immediately informed the officers that he had two knives and began

to reach toward his waist area to show the officers.
10.

Officer Olsen intervened and located the knives.

11.

One knife was located in a sheath on Mr. Despain's belt in a horizontal position

across his belly. It was a very large, heavy knife approximately a foot long.

12.

The other knife was much smaller and was located in a sheath hanging vertically

from his belt.
13.

Neither weapon was initially visible to either officer because Mr. Despain had a

plaid shirt on which was untucked and dropped below the waist area.
14.

Officer Slaugh consulted his State Code in his vehicle and concluded, because of

the character of, nature of, accessibflity, location, size and sharpness of the large knife and the fact
that the knife was not securely encased, to charge Mr. Despain with concealing a dangerous
weapon.
15.

Officer Slaugh went back to Mr. Despain and placed him under arrest for

possession of a concealed weapon. He then proceeded to make arrangements for conducting a
"search incident to arrest."
16.

Another officer team, which was patrolling in the area arrived to offer backup to

Officers Slaugh and Olsen.
17.

Officer Richard Allred, one of these officers, began searching the passenger side

of the truck cab where co-defendant, Mrs. Despain was seated. He located a zip lock baggy with
a green leafy substance which appeared like, and smelled like marijuana. In addition he located a
red plastic container with some green, leafy substance in it and also a glass methamphetamine
pipe.
18.

Officer Slaugh intended to search the driver's side cab area of the pickup while

Officer Allred searched the passenger side cab area, but Officer Slaugh was distracted by a small
child sleeping in the open bed of the trunk.
19.

Shortly after Officer Allred had located and identified suspected controlled

substances in the cab, Officer Slaugh searched the bed area of the truck, located a backpack/
purple bag wherein he found a green leafy substance and a pipe.
20.

Mrs. Despain was placed under arrest, but the purple bag and her purse were

searched before she was actually arrested.
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21.

The trailer was searched next and various officers located afivefoot long glass

tube and a small glass tube with a rubber connector, which the officers suspected to be
components of a methamphetamine lab. The search of the trailer was discontinued about 2 a.m.
Because of the darkness, the extreme cold, and for health, safety and welfare reasons for the
officers and the public; they thought they might locate hazardous or toxic material.
22.

The truck and trailer were towed to an impound lot at KC Auto.

23;

Later that same morning, about 11 a.m. to noon, after consulting with the county

attorney, without obtaining a warrant, officers began searching the vehicle and trailer again. A
100 ml. beaker was located as well as a small mason jarfilledwith blue iodine crystals.
24.

The officers then summoned DEA officers and also obtained a search warrant.

Afinalsearch was then conducted and officers located some bottles of isopropyl alcohol and
hydrogen peroxide and some duct tape.

n.
LEGAL ISSUES
Defendant seeks to suppress the evidence based upon the following legal arguments:
A.

The initial stop of the defendants was unlawful;

B.

The detention of the defendants after the stop was unlawful;

C.

The arrest of the defendant was unlawful;

D.

The search of the vehicle and particularly the trailer was unlawful; and

E.

There were no exigent circumstances justifying a continued warrantless search.

m.
DISCUSSION
A.

Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-120 provides:
(a) Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer and pole trailer,
and any other vehicle which is being drawn at the end of a
combination of vehicles, shall be equipped with at least two tail
lamps mounted on the rear, which shall comply with regulations
-4-

issued by the department; provided, the department may by
regulation allow one tail lamp on any vehicle equipped with
only one when it was made, (b) Either a tail lamp or a separate
lamp shall be so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a
white light the rear registration plate. Such lamp shall comply
with requirements of the department.
Officer Slaugh testified that there was no license plate illumination on the trailer in
violation of 41-60-120, and that was why he stopped the subject vehicle. The Courtfindsthe
stop lawful.
B. The Detention
As one officer is asking for a license, another officer was asking whether Mr. Despain
had any weapons. In light of the officer's previously dealings with the defendant, approximately
thirty days before, he knew that he had been recently armed with a handgun and considered armed
and dangerous.
Therefore, in light of the very recent history, the inquiry, for officer safety was
authorized. When two weapons were located, one being a very large and heavy bowie-type knife
concealed horizontally on his waist, under a shirt, it was reasonable to detain the defendant
further. At that time, as pointed out by defense counsel, the scope of the stop is still limited and
the officer must diligently pursue a means of investigation which is likely to confirm or dispel his
suspicions quickly.
Mr. Despain was detained momentarily while the officer reviewed the law. Mr..
Despain's detention was very short, pending review of the Code. The Courtfindsthe detention
lawful.
C. Was the arrest lawful?
The statute regarding concealed weapons provides:
(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous weapon, as defined in Section
76-10-501, which is not afirearmon his person or one that is readily
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accessible for immediate use which is not securely encased, as defined in this
part, in a place other than his residence, property, or business under his
control is guilty of a class B misdemeanor,
76-10-501. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) (a) "Concealed dangerous weapon" means a dangerous weapon that is
covered, hidden, or secreted in a manner that the public would not be aware
of its presence and is readily accessible for immediate use.
The subject knife, long and bowie-like, was located in a sheath placed horizontally
across the belly-waist area of defendant. It was completely concealed by the untucked shirt.
Though carried in a sheath, the officer testified that it was not securely encased, that it was easily
accessible and was very sharp. The Court finds that there was probable cause to arrest the
defendant on the charge of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon. It was a dangerous weapon
and it was "covered, hidden, or secreted in a manner that the public would not be aware of its
presence and (was) accessible for immediate use."
D. The search of the vehicle and the trailer.
Since the arrest was proper, a search incident to the arrest is authorized by law. It is the
opinion of this Court that a search incident to arrest of a driver of a vehicle is allowed in the
interior compantment area of the vehicle. Thus, the search of the cab of the truck was allowed by
law. Once drugs and drug paraphernalia were located in the cab of the truck, the officers were
allowed by law to search the truck bed and the fifth wheel utility trailer. The trailer was not a
house trailer, but a construction-type, open trailer.
E. Validity of Continued Search
Officer Slaugh testified that it was dark while the officers conducted the search at the
scene, and that it was very cold. Officers at the scene searched the truck and trailer for a few
minutes and then had to get warmed up in their patrol cars. Officer Slaugh further testified that
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the vehicles were impounded and the search discontinued because of officer safety, cold
conditions and darkness.
The Court has already found that the initial searches at the scene were constitutionally
valid, and that initial search resulted in the discovery of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Probable
cause to continue a more careful search in a safe and secure setting during daylight was extant.
There is no need to seek a warrant tQ further search the vehicle or its trailer since there was clear
justification to continue the search
DECISION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' Motions to Suppress are denied. Counsel
for the State of Utah is instructed to prepare an order consistent with this decision.
Dated this ^7

day of December, 2000.
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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 991500176 FS

MATTHEW L DESPAIN,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

LYNN W. DAVIS
August 15, 2001

PRESENT
Clerk:
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Prosecutor: LOW, THOMAS L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): BESENDORFER, MARK A.
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: December 21, 1955
Video
Tape Number:
551 (Provo)
Tape Count: 8:31
CHARGES
1. OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE LABORATORY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/15/2001 {Guilty Plea}
7. DEMAND FOR FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY - Not Applicable
- Disposition: 06/15/2001 Bail Forfeiture
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE
LABORATORY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Case No: 991500176
Date:
Aug 15, 2001

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE
LABORATORY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a
term of 9 month(s) in the Wasatch County Jail.

SENTENCE JAIL RELEASE TIME NOTE
Defendant is authorized work release and therapy release.
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The jail time in this case may run concurrent with Case 991500144
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$10000.00
$9075.00
$425.00
$925.00

Charge # 2
Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$10000.00
$9075.00
$425.00
$925.00
Plus Interest

SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE
Defendant is ordered to pay the fine at the rate of $50 per month
to Adult Probation and Parole.
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Case No: 991500176
Date:
Aug 15, 2001
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 6 month(s) .
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole.
Defendant to serve 270 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to report, to the Wasatch County Jail.
Defendant is to report-'by September 15, 2001.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 925.00 which includes the surcharge.
Interest may increase the final amount due.
Pay fine to The Court.
Defendant is ordered to enter into a formal, written agreement with
Adult Probation and Parole within 10 days.
Defendant is ordered to advise Adult Probation and Parole and this
Court of a current address at all times.
Defendant is ordered to appear any time notice is sent.
Defendant is ordered to comply with all laws.
Defendant is ordered to enter into and successfully complete
substance abuse treatment through a provider approved by Adult
Probation and Parole.
Defendant is ordered to submit his person, auto, place of residence
or any property under his control to search for detection of
alcohol or drugs by the probation officer and submit to drug
testing at the request of the probation officer.
Defendant is ordered to use no alcohol or illicit drugs while on
probation and not frequent establishments where alcohol is the
chief item of order.
Defendant is ordered to not frequent places where drugs are used or
sold, not associate with persons known to use non-prescribed
substances without prior knowledge of his probation officer.
Defendant is ordered to maintain full time employment.
The case may be reviewed after the defendant has served six months.
Upon his cooperation and compliance with the terms and conditions
of probation, the Court may consider an early release.
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I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 991500176 by the method and on the date
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METHOD

NAME
MARK A. BESENDORFER
ATTORNEY DEF
942 East 7145 South #A-102
MIDVALE, UT 84047
THOMAS L LOW
ATTORNEY PLA
805 West 100 South
Heber City UT 84032
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